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INTRODUCTION
In late 2009, an investment arbitration tribunal organized
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules before the Permanent Court
of Arbitration released its Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissi-
bility in the case of Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. Russian Fed-
eration ("Yukos Universal").' The Tribunal, composed of three
* LLM (Toronto), JD (Bond), BA (McGill) is called to the bar in New York State
and New South Wales and is currently articling with the oil and gas group at
McCarthy Tetrault LLP in Calgary. Prior to joining McCarthy, Paul worked in
commercial litigation in Australia and investment arbitration in Toronto. He has
published numerous articles on international investment law and arbitration with
a particular focus on jurisdictional issues.
1 Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. Russian Federation (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009),
available at http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/YULvRussianFederation-Interim
Award-30Nov2009.pdf.
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prominent authorities on international investment law,2 held that it
had jurisdiction under Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty3 to de-
cide the merits of the claim filed by Yukos Universal Limited against
the Russian Federation. The award, at 226 pages and over 600
paragraphs, constitutes a comprehensive examination of five separate
jurisdictional issues debated extensively by the parties and involving
the written opinions and testimony of no fewer than twenty-three ad-
ditional legal experts.'
The Tribunal's decision ensures that Yukos Universal has
standing to have its allegations of expropriation heard and, in the case
of a conclusive finding of liability, an award rendered in its favour.'
Considering the politically sensitive nature of the Yukos Universal
saga and the large potential damages involved, this development is in
itself noteworthy.' However, the Yukos Universal Interim Award
("Award") is significant for reasons which extend far past the specific
circumstances of the ongoing Yukos dispute. In particular, the Award
2 See id. The Arbitral Tribunal consisted of Chairman L. Yves Fortier, CC, QC,
Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, and Dr. Charles Poncet. Id.
3 Energy Charter Treaty, art. 26, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100, 34 I.L.M. 360,
available at http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user-upload/document/EN.pdf
[hereinafter ECTI.
4 Russia presented nineteen experts while Yukos Universal presented four.
Yukos Universal's experts included Professor W. Michael Reisman of Yale Law
School and Professor James Crawford of Cambridge University. See Yukos Univer-
sal, at ii.
5 It must be noted that the Yukos Universal claim has two sister claims. These
are Hulley Enterprises Ltd. v Russian Federation and Veteran Petroleum Trust v.
Russian Federation. All three claims are proceeding simultaneously under the
ECT, involve the same essential allegations, and are being heard by the same Ar-
bitral Tribunal. See Hulley Enterprises Ltd. (Cyprus) v. Russian Federation
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/HELvRussian
Federation-InterimAward-30Nov2009.pdf; Veteran Petroleum Ltd. (Cyprus) v.
Russian Federation (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/docu-
ments/VPLvRussianFederation-InterimAward-30Nov2009.pdf. Crucially, the de-
cisions rendered in Hulley and Veteran mirror those discussed here.
6 Together the claimants, including Yukos Universal, Hulley, and Veteran, are
seeking a total of over $50 billion in damages. Arbitration Scorecard 2007: Top 50
Treaty Disputes, Am. LAw., June 13, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=
1181639136817. Other investment claims instituted against Russia in connection
with Yukos Oil Corporation include RosInvestCo U.K Ltd. v. Russian Federation
and Renta 4 S.V.S.A. et al. v. Russian Federation. However, these claims were not
filed pursuant to the ECT but rather pursuant to bilateral investment treaties
signed by Russia with the U.K. and Spain., respectively. See Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al.
v. Russian Federation, Award on Preliminary Objections, Arb. No. 24-2007 (Arb.
Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Mar. 2009); RosInvestCo U.K. Ltd.
v Russian Federation, Award on Jurisdiction, Arb. No. V 079/2005 (Arb. Inst. of
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Oct. 2007).
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stands as an unambiguous affirmation of two contested principles of
international investment law concerning the jurisdiction of investment
tribunals constituted under Article 26 of the ECT to decide claims
brought by certain investors. First, the Award clearly affirms the deci-
sion of several previous investment tribunals that Article 1(7) of the
ECT does not function to deny standing to shell companies incorpo-
rated under the laws of a signatory to the ECT in the absence of any
extenuating circumstances. 7 Second, the Award clearly affirms the de-
cision of a previous investment tribunal that Article 17(1) of the ECT
is unavailable to respondent states to deny an investor standing once
the investor has already commenced arbitral proceedings.
This article will examine the ramifications of the Yukos Uni-
versal Award in these two respects. In particular, it will focus on the
impact the reasoning in the Award has on the ability of firms operat-
ing in the international energy sector to access the protective provi-
sions of the ECT even if they do not have any established operations in
the territory of any of the treaty's signatory states. The ECT is per-
haps the most comprehensive and far-ranging international invest-
ment agreement concluded to date.' It provides investors with a
diverse array of protective guarantees designed to protect foreign en-
ergy investment from adverse governmental treatment and political
risk. These protective guarantees are reinforced by the Treaty's provi-
sion for investment arbitration before an independent arbitral tribu-
nal where an investor alleges that the hos state or related third parties
have illegally interfered with its investments. Furthermore, the ECT
has been signed by more states than any comparable multilateral in-
vestment treaty, with Asia and Europe being particularly well repre-
sented.' These are invaluable attributes in an increasingly hostile
international energy market in which a renewed cycle of resource na-
tionalism has lead to increased tensions between private international
energy firms and the energy-rich states and state-owned companies
with whom they do business.o As a result, the ECT is and is likely to
7 Yukos Universal, [[ 411-417.
8 See Thomas Walde, Investment Arbitration Under the Energy Charter Treaty:
From Dispute Settlement to Treaty Implementation, 12 ARB. INT'L 429 (1996).
9 The most prominent full members of the Treaty include the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Japan. In total, the ECT is in full legal
force in 46 countries. See Energy Charter Secretariat, Status of Ratification of the
Energy Charter Treaty as of October 2009, http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/
user upload/document/ECT ratification-status.pdf.
10 See Alexia Brunet & Juan Agustin Lentini, Arbitration of International Oil,
Gas, and Energy Disputes in Latin America, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 591 (2007);
F. Robert Buchanan & Syed Tariq Anwar, Resource Nationalism and the Chang-
ing Business Model for Global Oil, 10 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 241 (2009);
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remain a highly desirable tool of investment protection for energy
firms both within and without its immediate purview. This is likely to
lead to continued treaty-shopping techniques of the type evidenced in
Yukos Universal. It is therefore necessary to determine how far the
ECT's jurisdictional provisions can be stretched before being broken,
both for the continued integrity of the ECT regime as well as for the
benefit of international energy firms looking to take advantage of the
ECT regime.
PART I: THE YUKOs DISPUTE
The Facts of the Dispute
The history of the Yukos saga invites the use of superlatives.
Yukos Oil Incorporated ("Yukos Oil") was originally created by presi-
dential decree as a joint-stock company in 1993.11 At the time of its
privatization in 1995-1996, it was a vertically integrated oil and gas
company with a wide variety of operations in hydrocarbon exploration,
production, refining, marketing, and distribution.1 2 In 2002, Yukos
Oil ranked among the world's ten largest oil and gas companies by
market capitalization along with its three main production subsidiar-
ies, Yuganskneftegaz, Samaraneftegaz, and Tomskneft.1 3 In 2003,
Yukos Oil merged with Sibneft, another Russian based oil and gas
company, and YukosSibneft was considered the world's fourth largest
oil producer following BP, Exxon, and Shell." Later that year Yukos
Kevin T. Jacobs & Matthew G. Paulson, The Convergence of Renewed Nationaliza-
tion, Rising Commodities, and "Americanization" in International Arbitration and
the Need for More Rigorous Legal and Procedural Defenses, 43 TEX. INT'L L.J. 359
(2008); George JoffM et al., Expropriation of Oil and Gas Investments: Historical,
Legal and Economic Perspectives in a New Age of Resource Nationalism, 2 J.
WORLD ENERGY L. & Bus. 3 (2009); F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Issue of Resource
Nationalism: Risk Engineering and Dispute Management in the Oil and Gas In-
dustry, 5 TEx. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 79 (2009-2010); Nick Prowse, Philip Roche,
Edward Walshe & Sherina Petit, NOCs and IOCs: Resolving Tensions, 8 INT'L EN-
ERGY L. REV. 285 (2009); Paul Stevens, National Oil Companies and International
Oil Companies in the Middle East: Under the Shadow of Government and the Re-
source Nationalism Cycle, 1 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & Bus. 5 (2008); Thomas W.
Walde, Renegotiating Acquired Rights in the Oil and Gas Industries: Industry and
Political Cycles Meet the Rule of Law, 1 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & Bus. 55 (2008);
Emily E. Witten, Arbitration of Venezuelan Oil Contracts: A Losing Strategy?, 4
TEx. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 55 (2008-2009).
11 Yukos Universal, 46.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 id.
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Oil was poised to grow even larger as merger negotiations had been
commenced with ExxonMobil and Chevron.1 5
The talks did not get far. During the summer of 2003 Russian
authorities began a series of criminal investigations into the opera-
tions of Yukos Oil.1' By the end of the year a number of the company's
key officers were arrested, charged, and imprisoned on counts includ-
ing embezzlement, tax evasion, money laundering, forgery and
fraud." The arrests, investigations, interrogations, searches, and
seizures continued through 2004, causing the majority of remaining
senior Yukos Oil officers to permanently flee the country for a variety
of overseas jurisdictions, including the U.K."a Throughout this period
Yukos Oil argued that its lawyers had been systematically obstructed
from working on the corporation's behalf." It alleged that this inter-
ference with and harassment of its operations was motivated prima-
rily by the participation of several of its highest officers, including
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in activities of the country's opposition par-
ties.2 0 Yukos Oil argued that the primary intention of the campaign,
regardless of Russia's representations, was to systematically national-
ize the company's assets and operations.2 1
Russia responded by arguing that these measures were war-
ranted reactions to an extensive pattern of illegal activity engaged in
by Yukos Oil intended to "to divert funds from Russian entities
through tax fraud and embezzlement."2 2 It argued that the company's
operations had been abused by an inner circle of senior officials who
exploited various loopholes in Russian tax law to enrich themselves at
the expense of the country's revenue authorities and the wider Rus-
sian public.2 3 These loopholes included special Russian low-tax zones
and other tax schemes that were misused to transfer the corporation's
revenues to offshore entities controlled by the inner circle.2 4 Russia
further argued that the company was engaged in a massive transfer
pricing scheme by which various petroleum products were sold to enti-
ties controlled by the Yukos Oil inner circle at below market prices for
on-sale into the wider global market.2 5 Russia's allegations also in-
cluded the commission of various corporate and criminal crimes by the
15 Id.
16 Id. 48.
17 Id. 49.
18 See id.
19 Id. T 50.
20 Id. 1 48.
21 Id.
22 Id. 52.
23 Id. 58.
24 Id.
25 Id. T 53.
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inner circle. It argued that the group had illegitimately increased its
majority shareholding by manipulating share prices to repurchase ad-
ditional shares at discount from the secondary market.26 It also al-
leged that the company had engaged in a series of serious violent
criminal acts including the murder, attempted murder, and assault of
officials seeking to enforce Russian tax codes.2 7
Regardless of the truth of these competing claims, the result
was the same. Following Russia's transition from a centrally planned
socialist country to a free market economy during the 1990s and early
2000s, Yukos Oil had emerged as the largest oil company in the coun-
try and one of the largest in the world. 2 8 By August 2006 it was bank-
rupt.2 9 Yukos Universal, a large shareholder of Yukos Oil
incorporated under the laws of the Isle of Man in the United Kingdom,
responded by initiating investment arbitration against Russia pursu-
ant to Article 26 of the ECT.ao Yukos Universal alleged that the vari-
ous criminal proceedings and taxation measures taken by Russia
against Yukos Oil constituted breaches of various protective provisions
of the ECT, including Russia's obligation not to unlawfully undermine
its investments."1 In particular, Yukos Universal argued that its
shareholdings in Yukos Oil had been eviscerated by the Kremlin's es-
sentially expropriatory conduct.3 2
The Energy Charter Treaty & Resource Nationalism
The ECT was signed in 1994 and remains the only binding
multilateral agreement concerned specifically with inter-governmen-
tal cooperation and investment protection in the energy sector.3 3 It is
a broad agreement that extends past investment protection and dis-
pute resolution provisions-the limits of most Investment Treaties 3 4-
to include provisions regarding energy trade, energy transportation
26 id.
27 Id. $ 54.
28 Id. 46.
29 Id. 56.
'0 As noted, Yukos Universal was joined in this claim by Hulley and Veteran. See
supra note 5.
31 Yukos Universal, 35.
32 See id. 369.
3 This special objective is clearly reflected in the text of the agreement, and Arti-
cle 2 provides that the treaty's purpose is to "promote long-term cooperation in the
energy field, based on complementarities and mutual benefits, in accordance with
the objectives and principles of the Charter." ECT, supra note 3, art. 2.
34 For a thorough analysis of the typical characteristics and content of Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs) and Multilateral Investment Treaties (MITs), see gen-
erally RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
(1995).
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and transmission, energy competition, energy efficiency, and environ-
mental protection." That said, the investment protection provisions
remain the "cornerstone of the treaty" with its principle goal being to
create "a level playing field for investments in the energy sector and to
minimize the non-commercial risks associated with such
investments.""
The ECT's investment protection provisions achieve this goal
in two main ways. First, they establish a series of guarantees which
prohibit "host" states from acting in a variety of ways that may illegiti-
mately interfere with the operations of an investment project or busi-
ness." These include the obligation to provide foreign investments
fair and equitable treatment, the obligation not to treat the invest-
ment in an arbitrary or discriminatory fashion, the obligation to ob-
serve all obligations entered into with respect of the investment,3 8 the
obligation not to unlawfully expropriate an investment," and the obli-
gation to provide the investment with both national treatment and
most favored nation treatment.4 0 Secondly, they provide investors
from "home" states with standing to arbitrate alleged breaches of these
protective provisions before independent arbitration tribunals capable
of rendering binding awards against the "host" state." According to
Article 26 such arbitration can occur before tribunals constituted
35 The unique nature of the ECT is explained by the economic, political, and his-
torical conditions surrounding its negotiation and completion. Following the de-
mise of the Soviet Union, international oil companies, particularly those from
Western Europe, were intent on gaining access to the newly accessible energy re-
sources of Russia and the other nations composing the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States (CIS). So too were Western European states interested in increasing
and diversifying gas supplies into their territories. However, while the countries of
the former Soviet Union were viewed as one of the greatest remaining opportuni-
ties for the West and western oil companies to increase their oil access and
reserves, these same places were simultaneously regarded as the areas of the
highest political risk worldwide. The ECT was designed to tackle these concerns in
a mutually beneficial fashion. See Thomas W. Waelde, International Energy In-
vestment, 17 ENERGY L.J. 191, 212-14 (1996); Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi,
Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: International Law Versus
Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. INT'L L. J. 215, 217 (1996).
36 Kaj Hober, The Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview, 8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT &
TRADE 323, 325 (2007); see also CAMPBELL McLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL IN-
VESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 2.51 (OxFoRn UNIV. PRESS, 2007)
(describing the primary purpose of the ECT as "creat[ing] a stable and reliable
framework for energy investments").
3 See ECT, supra note 3, arts. 10(1), 13.
38 Id. art. 10(1).
3 Id. art. 13.
40 Id. arts. 10(3), 10(7).
41 Id. art. 26.
2011] 185
186 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 10:2
under the auspices of the SCC or before an ad hoc tribunal constituted
according to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.4 2 In the event that
both the "home" state of the investor and the "host" state in which the
investment has been made are signatories of the ICSID Convention,
arbitration may also take place before a tribunal constituted under the
provisions of that instrument. 3
Although many consider the ECT to be the most ambitious and
successful international investment treaty yet completed, many of the
most prolific energy consuming and exporting countries are not parties
to it.44 The United States was involved in the negotiations of the ECT
and signed the Treaty in December of 1991 but declined to ratify it.45
The same is the case with Canada.46 As such, both countries have
opted to maintain mere "observer" status regarding the treaty.47 This
only gives them the right to attend all meetings of Charter members
and to take part in discussions regarding the Treaty's future. Simi-
larly, Australia has signed the ECT and is considered a member of the
Charter but has yet to ratify it.4 8 Consequently, while these countries
and others are home to many of the world's most internationally active
oil and gas firms, these companies do not immediately benefit from the
comparatively broad protective provisions of the ECT. This makes the
Treaty a highly desirable but not immediately accessible tool of over-
sea oil and gas investment protection. In turn, this leads to various
investment decisions which stress the bounds of the ECT's jurisdic-
tional provisions. This was the case in Yukos Universal.
42 Id.
43 Arbitration before an ICSID tribunal holds several advantages not matched by
similar forums. First, awards rendered by an ICSID tribunal may not be vacated
at the seat of arbitration (i.e. where the jurisdiction in which the award was ren-
dered). Secondly, ICSID awards are not subject to review in the jurisdiction in
which enforcement is sought. See Giorgio Sacerdoti, Investment Arbitration under
ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules, 19 ICSID REVIEw -FILJ (2004).
44 See Energy Treaty Charter Secretariat, supra note 9.
4 See Edna Sussman, The Energy Charter Treaty's Investor Protection Provisions:
Potential to Foster Solutions to Global Warming and Promote Sustainable Develop-
ment, 14 ILSA J. INT'L & ComP.L. 391, 396 (2008).
46 Lucy Reed & Lucy Martinez, The Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview, 14 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 405, 420 (2008).
47 Energy Charter, Members & Observers, http://www.encharter.org/index.php?
id=61&L=0.
4 Other prominent observer nations include Venezuela, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia,
Iran, China, and Indonesia. See id.
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The Jurisdictional Arguments
Russia raised five separate jurisdictional objections before the
tribunal;4 9 the first three of these arguments need not be discussed
extensively here. Russia first argued that the ECT was inoperative in
the circumstances because the Russian parliament had never ratified
the ECT even though it had signed the treaty in 1994.50 Second, Rus-
sia next argued that some, if not all, of Yukos Universal's claims were
barred from arbitration under the ECT by virtue of the taxation
"carve-out" provisions of ECT Article 21.51 Third, Russia alleged that
Yukos Universal's claims were barred by the "fork-in-the-road" provi-
sion of Article 26(3) of the ECT.5 2 All of these are important argu-
ments that occupied much of the tribunal's time and attention. For
example, the question of whether the ECT applied provisionally in
Russia despite its non-ratification was given particularly thorough
treatment, especially from the perspective of whether provisional ap-
plication of an international treaty was consistent with Russia's inter-
nal municipal law.5 3 Each of these arguments was ultimately
unsuccessful, however.54 Furthermore, and much more importantly
for the purposes of this investigation, none of these arguments is di-
rectly relevant to the practice of treaty shopping in the context of the
ECT.
This is not the case with Russia's final two objections. In this
regard, Russia did not contest that Yukos Universal was an entity in-
corporated in the Isle of Man and as such was prima facie an investor
of the United Kingdom, a signatory of the ECT.5 s Nor did Russia ar-
gue that the over fifty million shares in Yukos Oil held by Yukos Uni-
versal constituted an investment under the ECT. Rather, Russia
focused on the circumstances of Yukos Universal's incorporation in the
Isle of Man, including the ownership structure behind Yukos Univer-
sal.5 In total, it argued that these wider circumstances either had the
effect of disqualifying Yukos Universal from benefitting from the ECT
from the investment's inception or gave Russia the ability to disqualify
it from the benefits of the ECT in the circumstances at hand, or both."
49 Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. Russian Federation, $$ 73, 243 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 2009), available at http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/YULvRussianFederation-
InterimAward-30Nov2009.pdf.
50 Id. 71(c).
51 Id. 579.
52 Id. 243(e).
53 See id. $$ 290-398.
54 Id. T 583.
ss Id. 72.
56 Id. T 404-05.
5 Id. $ 406-07.
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Russia emphasized that, while Yukos Universal owned over
fifty million shares in Yukos Oil,"8 it was part of a larger chain of legal
entities and instruments not properly British in character. It high-
lighted that Yukos Universal was wholly owned by GML, a company
registered in Gibraltar whose principle business activity was con-
ducting investment activities through wholly-owned subsidiaries."9
Further, Russia alleged that the shares of GML were held by a series
of trusts created in Guernsey whose beneficiaries were a number of
Russian nationals and former senior executives of Yukos Oil and its
subsidiaries, including Mr. Khodorkovsky.o As such, while Yukos
Universal was clearly a U.K. investor on paper, a more substantial
investigation of the company clearly revealed that the corporation was
a mere appendage of a much larger investment scheme ultimately
owned and controlled by Russian nationals rather than truly foreign
investors."1 Thus, Russia argued that it was inappropriate for Yukos
Universal to have access to the ECT, a multilateral investment treaty
designed primarily to safeguard foreign investment conducted by in-
vestors from one signatory in the territory of another signatory.6 2
PART 2: ECT ARTICLE 1(7) AND SHELL COMPANIES
Introduction to ECT Article 1(7)
In order to establish standing under the ECT to bring an in-
vestment arbitration claim, a purported investor must meet two fun-
damental tests." First, it must prove that it has made an
"investment" as recognized by the Treaty. This is determined by ECT
Article 1(6) which captures a broad range of legal assets and interests,
including "any right conferred by law or contract or by virtue of any
licenses and permits granted pursuant to law to undertake any Eco-
nomic Activity in the Energy Sector."64 Secondly, it must prove that it
is an investor as recognized by the Treaty. This is determined by ECT
Article 1(7). It defines "investor" to mean:
"(a) with respect to a Contracting Party:
5 Id. 463.
59 Id.
60 Id. 483.
61 Id. T 407.
62 Id. 433.
63 See Emmanuel Gaillard, Investments and Investors Covered by the Energy
Charter Treaty, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 54,
57-58 (Clarisse Ribeiro ed., 2006); Stephen Jagusch & Anthony Sinclair, The Lim-
its of Protection for Investments and Investors under the Energy Charter Treaty, in
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY, supra, at 73, 73.
6 ECT, supra note 3, art. 1(6)(f).
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(ii) a company or other organization organized in accor-
dance with the law applicable in that Contracting Party" 5
As such, the plain text of ECT Article 1(7) provides that a company
organized in accordance with the laws of a Contracting Party will be
considered an "investor" for its purposes.
The Arguments of the Parties
Russia argued that the provisions of Article 1(7) are not as sim-
ple as they might at first appear. While Article 1(7) might seem to
limit its inquiry to whether a purported investor is lawfully consti-
tuted in an ECT Contracting State, other principles of international
law as well as various other international law instruments require
that any inquiry into the standing of an investor go further. 6 Russia
argued that the ECT was designed to provide for the arbitration of
disputes between investors national to one signatory and the govern-
ment of a second signatory.6 ' As such, Russia argued that Yukos Uni-
versal was not entitled to the protections of the ECT as it was a shell
company owned and controlled by Russian oligarchs and because it did
not wield any effective ownership or control over the shares in ques-
tion.6 1 It argued that the incorporation and insertion of Yukos Univer-
sal into the wider Yukos corporate chain should not be allowed to give
Russian nationals the right to bring a claim against their own govern-
ment under an international treaty when the shell company was cre-
ated for no other discernable bona fide purpose. 9
Yukos Universal responded by arguing that Russia was unnec-
essarily and illegitimately complicating the issue before the Tribu-
nal.70 Because Yukos Universal was organized in accordance with the
laws of the Isle of Man, there remained nothing else for the Tribunal to
consider. Towards this end Yukos Universal argued that the Treaty
said and did nothing that could compel Tribunals to conduct an exami-
nation of the nationality of the shareholders standing behind an other-
wise qualified investor.n Rather, it claimed, "there is no basis for
interpreting Article 1(7) in any way other than pursuant to its plain,
65 ECT, supra note 3, art. 1(7). ECT Article 1(7) is wide in its use of the term
"organized" rather than "incorporated." As discussed by Dominique D'Allaire, this
is a more general term capable of capturing entities other than corporations such
as joint ventures, partnerships, and associations. See Dominique D'Allaire, The
Nationality Rules Under the Energy Charter Treaty: Practical Considerations, 10
J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 39, 42 (2009).
66 Yukos Universal, 406.
67 Id. 71(46).
68 Id. I 71(42), 71(44).
69 Id. IT 71(42), 71(44), 407.
70 Id. 1 408.
71 Id.
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express terms."7 2 To impose any additional standard would be to di-
rectly violate the express terms agreed upon by the Contracting
States.7 3 Therefore, Yukos argued that "it is not for [the] Tribunal to
ignore the express language of the Treaty itself' and that "[e]xpress
treaty language cannot be overridden by alleged general principles of
law."7 4
The Decision of the Tribunal
The Tribunal went about its decision in an orderly manner,
noting the following facts. Yukos Universal was incorporated in the
Isle of Man on September 24, 1997.75 The United Kingdom (U.K.) had
extended its ratification of the ECT to the Isle of Man, which is consid-
ered by U.K. law to be a Crown Dependency.76 Finally, Yukos Univer-
sal remained incorporated under the laws of the Isle of Man at the
date it filed its claim pursuant to ECT Article 26.
Turning to Article 1(7), the Tribunal highlighted that Article
31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires that "a
treaty must be interpreted first on the basis of its plain language."7
With this in mind, the Tribunal then held that "[o]n its face, Article
1(7)(a)(ii) of the ECT contains no requirement other than that the
claimant company be duly organized in accordance with the law appli-
cable in a Contracting Party."7 In other words, "in order to qualify as
a protected Investor under Article 1(7) of the ECT, a company is
merely required to be organized under the laws of the Contracting
Party."so It thus found that, as Yukos Universal was so organized, it
satisfied Article 1(7) and little else needed to be said. In fact, in the
circumstances the Tribunal was "not entitled, by the terms of the ECT,
to find otherwise."
72 id.
7 Id. T 409.
74 Id. 72(22).
75 Id. I 404.
76 Id. T 405.
7 Id. 404. Yukos Universal filed its Notice of Arbitration on 3 February 3, 2005.
Id.
78 Id. 411.
7 Id.
80 Id.
8' Id. T 413.
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PART 3: ECT ARTICLE 17(1) AD SHELL COMPANIES
Introduction to ECT Article 17
Article 17 is the final article of Part III of the ECT and provides
for the "Non-Application of Part III in Certain Circumstances."8 2 Part
III of the ECT establishes the various protective guarantees host
states extend to foreign enterprises that invest in their territory. Arti-
cle 17 specifies that:
Each Contracting Party reserves the right to deny the
advantages of this Part to:
(1) a legal entity if citizens or nationals of a third state
own or control such entity and if that entity has no sub-
stantial business activities in the Area of the Con-
tracting Party in which it is organized[.]"
Consequently, ECT Article 17 gives contracting state parties the
power to deny the advantages of the Treaty to investors if they are
"owned" or "controlled" by a national of a third state and if the investor
has "no substantial business activities" in the area of the contracting
party in which it is organized.8 4 However, Article 17 does not is
clearly outline the conditions and circumstances in which an ECT sig-
natory can properly exercise this authority.
The Arguments of the Parties
Russia essentially argued that, as Article 17 does not impose
any conditions on its exercise, it is only reasonable to conclude that the
Article can be exercised at any time by a signatory at its complete dis-
cretion." As such, Russia purported to affirmatively employ the pro-
vision during the course of its arguments to immediately deny all
benefits of the ECT to Yukos Universal, its beneficial owners, "and
every one of their offshore shell companies and structures."" Russia
argued that no legitimate objection to this conclusion could be made as
Article 17 should put the burden of compliance on the investor rather
than on the host state. In other words, Article 17 functions to require
shell companies coming within its scope to "obtain a commitment from
the host State that it will be treated as protected investors."" To in-
terpret the Article otherwise would be to impose an impossible burden
on host states.88 Russia further maintained that to do so would be to
82 ECT, supra note 3, art. 17.
83 ECT, supra note 3, art. 17(1).
84 Id.
85 Yukos Universal, lT[ 445-47.
86 Id. 447.
87 Id. 446.
88 Id. T 452.
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impose the burden of identifying whether each and every investment
entering the country had substantial business activities in its pur-
ported home jurisdiction.8 9
Yukos Universal countered that the language of Article 17 pro-
vides only that each signatory "reserves the right to deny the advan-
tages" of the ECT to purported shell companies or holding
companies.90 In this regard it relied on the jurisdictional ruling of the
Tribunal in Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, which dis-
tinguished between the existence of a right and the exercise of that
right.9 1 Yukos Universal also relied on the expert opinion of Professor
James Crawford, who had argued that the notion that Article 17 re-
quires each individual investor to obtain express assurance of protec-
tion was "plainly not the intention" of the ECT.9 2 As such, Yukos
Universal argued that Article 17 required that a host state give an
investor reasonable notice before exercising its rights to deny the bene-
fits of the ECT to that investor.9 3 It then stated the language and the
intent of the ECT insured that the legitimate exercise of Article 17 was
incapable of having retrospective effect.9 4 If the drafters of the ECT
had intended otherwise they would have specifically provided as such
in the Treaty's terms.95
The Decision of the Tribunal
The Tribunal began its decision by acknowledging that Article
17 is not technically a matter of jurisdiction but rather of the merits of
the case." Stated differently, it acknowledged that Article 17 is prop-
erly about whether the investor is entitled to protection, not whether a
tribunal has authority to decide the case. Thus, it is a matter properly
left to the merits phase of arbitration rather than one appropriate for a
jurisdictional hearing. However, the court noted that because the par-
ties had treated Article 17 as a matter of admissibility in their submis-
89 Id.
90 Id. 448.
91 Id. 449 (citing Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 44 I.L.M. 721, 745 (Feb. 8, 2005).
92 Id. 448.
9 Id. 1 450 (citing Plama, 44 I.L.M. at 746).
94 Id. (citing Plama, 44 I.L.M. at 746).
9 Id. 454.
96 Id. T 441. The same determination was made by the Tribunal in Plama v. Bul-
garia. See Plama, 44 I.L.M. at 743-44. Note, however, that not all commentators
agree with this interpretation. See Laurence Shore, The Jurisdiction Problem in
Energy Charter Treaty Claims, 10 INT'L ARB. L. REV. 58, 63 (2007) (arguing that it
is plausible that Article 17 "constitutes a jurisdictional consideration for an arbi-
tral tribunal"). Note also that the distinction is not a trivial one. See Hober, supra
note 36, at 347.
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sions, the interests of judicial economy would be better served if it
were addressed in the immediate proceedings.9 7
Turning towards the substance of Article 17, the Tribunal first
highlighted that Article 17 does not outright prohibit shell companies
from having access to the ECT." Had the drafters of the ECT wished
to do so, the Tribunal opined, they easily could have.99 Consequently,
the Tribunal determined that, rather than absolutely outlaw shell
companies, Article 17 functions merely to "reserve[ ] the right" of ECT
Contracting Parties to deny the advantages of Part III to such compa-
nies. 0o It held that, in order to deny the benefits of the ECT to shell
companies controlled by nationals of a third party state, a Contracting
Party must affirmatively exercise its Article 17 right.1 o0 Most impor-
tantly, the Tribunal could identify no such exercise by Russia material
to the dispute at hand.1 0 2 It recognized that Russia had purported to
exercise Article 17 in its submissions. 1 0 3 However, it held that this
action was of no consequence to Yukos Universal because such an ex-
ercise of Article 17 could only be prospective in nature and thus could
not affect the standing of an investor whose investment dispute pre-
dated the announcement.o10 The Tribunal found that such retrospec-
tive application of Article 17 would "be incompatible 'with the
objectives and principles of the Charter"' paramount among which are
the "'Promotion, Protection and Treatment of investments' as specified
by the terms of Article 10 of the Treaty." 0 ' As such, the Tribunal held
that, while Russia's purported exercise of Article 17 might function to
prohibit future ECT arbitrations launched by shell companies organ-
ized in the United Kingdom, Yukos Universal's ECT arbitration claim
was free to proceed.10 6
9 Yukos Universal, 443.
98 Id. 456.
9 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. 456-59. The Tribunal also quickly dismissed Russia's argument that an
indirectly related piece of national legislation dealing with the characterization of
foreign investors could constitute an exercise of Article 17 because it did not ex-
pressly refer to the ECT while the ECT in no way provided for it.
103 Id.
104 Id. 458.
105 Id.
106 Id. 459.
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PART 4: ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
Article 1(7)
When Russia argued that Yukos Universal was not an investor
under the ECT because it was a shell company,' it invoked what has
become a familiar contention in investment arbitration case law. This
argument begins with the premise that the fundamental purpose of
international investment protection treaties such as the ECT is to af-
ford protection to investors of one signatory who conduct investments
in the territory of a second signatory. This argument next holds that
this fundamental purpose can be abused in two circumstances. First,
where nationals of a particular state incorporate a shell company in
another state solely for the goal of securing the protection of an invest-
ment treaty concluded by that country with the investor's home state.
Second, where nationals of a third state incorporate a shell company in
a state solely for the purpose of securing the protection of an invest-
ment treaty concluded by that country with the host state in which the
investor plans on making its investment.
In Yukos Universal, Russia objected to the first of these two
practices. Namely, it objected to the fact that a holding company was
used by Russian nationals to bring an international claim against
their own country.108 However, the provisions of the ECT make it
equally as likely that the second situation could have occurred. For
example, instead of being controlled by Russian nationals, Yukos Uni-
versal could have been used by an American or Canadian company to
bring an ECT action against Russia even though neither of those coun-
tries are ECT signatories. This would have been possible if the Ameri-
can or Canadian company had attained control of Yukos Universal
prior to the onset of the dispute. Although different, each situation
involves the expansion of the Treaty's protections to investors beyond
its immediate ambit through the use of a shell company. Further-
more, each situation is vulnerable to criticism by those who oppose
such supposed "treaty shopping" techniques.
Where investors of a host state use a shell company in a second
state with whom the host state has signed an investment treaty to
gain protection under that treaty, it is alleged that the treaty has been
abused to provide for international investment arbitration where the
dispute is in fact essentially domestic in nature. Critics find several
problems with this state of affairs. First, they highlight that invest-
ment arbitration is unnecessary in these circumstances because the
investor should not face any undue prejudice by proceeding in the local
courts of the state in question. This criticism reflects the fact that one
107 Id. 1 407.
108 Id.
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of the underlying purposes behind the investment treaty regime is to
give foreign investors the ability to pursue claims before an indepen-
dent international arbitration tribunal, lest they fear they would face
significant prejudice bringing similar claims against a host state in
that state's own courts.109 Secondly, critics highlight that local inves-
tors who channel their otherwise domestic investments through for-
eign conduits are not in fact importing any capital into the country
that was not already there.o This criticism reflects the fact that an-
other underlying purpose behind the investment treaty regime is to
provide protection to foreign investors in the hope of attracting foreign
capital into the country to spur increased economic growth and
development. 1 1 '
Where investors of a third state use a shell company estab-
lished in a country that has signed an investment treaty with a host
state in which the investor intends to expand its operations in order to
gain access to the protection of that treaty, it is alleged that the treaty
has been abused in a different fashion. Here it is alleged that the in-
vestor has "freeloaded" onto a treaty that was not properly intended to
apply to the investor.' 1 2 Thus, while the investor or capital invested
might be foreign, the result is nonetheless adduced to be illegitimate
because the investor gained access to protective provisions for which
its home state did not have to make any corresponding sacrifices.1 13
This violates the principle of reciprocity at the heart of all investment
treaties whereby each signatory sacrifices aspects of its sovereign im-
munity by giving certain causes of action to foreign investors investing
in their territory." 4 This sacrifice allows the nationals of each signa-
tory to benefit from the same waivers of sovereign immunity when in-
vesting in the territories of the other treaty signatories.
A growing number of investment tribunals have had to deal
with these scenarios. For example, the Tribunals in Tokios Tokelds v.
Ukraine"5 and Rompetrol v. Romania were both faced with claims
109 See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIs PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 24-29 (Kluwer Law International, 2009).
110 See Tokios Tokelds v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Dissenting Opinion
of Prosper Weil, [ 20 (Apr. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Tokios-Dissenting].
" See id. '[1[ 3-5.
112 See Jagusch & Sinclair, supra note 63, at 100.
113 Id.
114 See Loukas A. Mistelis & Crina Mihaela Baltag, Denial of Benefits and Article
17 of the Energy Charter Treaty, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1301, 1302 (2009).
115 Tokios Tokelds v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdic-
tion, [1[ 1-3 (Apr. 29, 2004).
116 Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Decision on Re-
spondent's Preliminary Objections on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, [ 50 (Apr.
18, 2008).
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brought by shell companies effectively controlled by investors national
to the host state being brought to arbitration. On the other hand, the
Tribunals in Mobil v. Venezuela,117 ADC v. Hungary,1 ' and Aguas del
Tunari v. Bolivia"' were all faced with claims brought by shell com-
panies effectively controlled by investors national to a third party state
that was not a signatory to the investment treaty pursuant to which
the arbitration claim was brought. This has lead to an increasingly
robust body of investment arbitration case law dealing with "treaty-
shopping" through the use of shell companies. Furthermore, unlike
other areas of international investment arbitration case law, this case
law has developed in a rather uniform fashion.12 0
These tribunals have adopted a literal approach to the inter-
pretation of nationality requirements in international investment
treaties.' 2 1 In other words, they have held that, regardless of the
other circumstances surrounding the corporate background of the in-
vestor in question, the interpretation and application of the invest-
ment treaty at hand must first and foremost be conducted pursuant to
the provisions of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties ("VCLT").12 2 This Article provides that a "treaty shall be in-
terpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose."12 As such, these tribunals have held that it is
not for them to "to substitute [their] views of the definition of the term
'investor' to that of the Contracting Parties to a BIT" (bilateral invest-
117 Mobil Corp. et al. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/
07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction, (June 10, 2010).
us ADC Affiliate Ltd. et al. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16,
Award of the Tribunal, 1 334-35 (Oct. 2, 2006).
119 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Deci-
sions on Respondent's Objections to Jurisdiction, T 154 (Oct. 21, 2005).
120 See Susan Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1521, 1555-59 (2005).
121 See D'Allaire, supra note 65, at 47-50. But see Markus Burgstaller, Nationality
of Corporate Investors and International Claims Against the Investor's Own State,
7 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 857 (2006) (arguing that international invest-
ment protection should be granted only if there is a genuine link between the or-
ganization and the state of incorporation); Robert Wisner & Nick Gallus,
Nationality Requirements in Investor-State Arbitration, 5 J. WORLD INVESTMENT &
TRADE 927 (2004) (providing examples of the complexities of determining the na-
tionality of investors in international investment treaties).
122 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
123 Id. at Article 31(1).
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ment treaty).12 4 They have held that to do so would be "tantamount to
setting aside the clear language agreed upon by the treaty Parties" in
favour of external considerations in clear violation of VCLT Article
31.125 Consequently, they have rejected the assertion that "economic
reality should prevail over formal legal structure when it comes to the
interpretation of . .. BITs for the purpose of ascertaining the national-
ity of corporate investors."126
The analysis of the Tribunal in Yukos Universal is a mirror re-
flection of this approach. In this regard it is also a clear affirmation of
the plain meaning doctrine. As discussed, the Yukos Universal Tribu-
nal began its analysis by noting that Yukos Universal was at all rele-
vant times organised according to the laws of the Isle of Man.12 7 It
then referred to Article 31 of the VCLT to decide that the plain lan-
guage and meaning of Article 1(7) of ECT had been satisfied by such
corporate organization. 1 28 Moreover, because Yukos Universal organ-
ized in accordance with the laws of the Isle of Man and satisfied the
requirements of ECT Article 1(7), the Tribunal held that it was "not
entitled" by the Treaty to come to any conclusion other than that
Yukos Universal had standing to pursue its claim as an investor of the
United Kingdom. 1 29 It recognized that "principles of international
law" have an "unquestionable importance in treaty interpretation."'
However, the Tribunal professed that it knew of "no general principles
of international law that would require investigating how a company
or another organization operates when the applicable treaty simply re-
quires it to be organized in accordance with the laws of a Contracting
Party." 3 1
This is not to say that the Yukos Universal Tribunal was en-
tirely comfortable with its ruling. Referring to Saluka Investments BV
v. Czech Republic, it acknowledged that the plain meaning doctrine
can easily lead to abuses by entities intent on treaty shopping. In that
case the Tribunal held that it had:
some sympathy for the argument that a company which
has no real connection with a State party to a BIT, and
which is in reality a mere shell company controlled by
another company which is not constituted under the
124 Rumeli Telekom A.S. et al.v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/
16, Award, 190 (July 29, 2008).
125 Rompetrol, 85.
126 Id.
127 Yukos Universal, 404.
128 Id. 411.
129 Id. 435.
130 Id. 415.
131 Id.
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laws of that State, should not be entitled to invoke the
provisions of that treaty. Such a possibility lends itself to
abuses of the arbitral procedure, and to practices of
'treaty-shopping' which can share many of the disadvan-
tages of the widely criticized practice of 'forum
shopping.1 3 2
However, like the tribunal in Saluka, the tribunal in Yukos
Universal ultimately decided that to purposefully disregard the plain
meaning of a treaty's text would be an even greater injustice than any
purported instance of "treaty shopping." It essentially held that "the
predominant factor which must guide the . . . exercise of its functions
is the terms in which the parties to the Treaty now in question have
agreed to establish the Tribunal's jurisdiction."3 3 Further following
the reasoning in Saluka, the Yukos Tribunal essentially held that it
could not "in effect impose upon the [state] parties [to the treaty] a
definition of 'investor' other than that which they themselves
agreed"134 and that it "was not open to" the Tribunal to "add other
requirements which the parties could themselves have added but
which they omitted to add."'3 5
The Yukos Universal Tribunal quoted the decision of the
Saluka Tribunal at length. 136 In doing so, it plainly revealed its own
concerns that the plain meaning approach, when coupled with defini-
tions of "investor" that require no more than organization in accor-
dance with the laws of a home state, creates opportunities for treaty
shopping. Nonetheless, it ultimately held that international law, in-
cluding the VCLT, does not allow arbitral tribunals "to write new, ad-
ditional requirements-which the drafters did not include-into a
treaty, no matter how auspicious or appropriate they may appear."137
The tribunal recognized that, because of the structure of the invest-
ment, it was possible that Yukos Universal was not responsible for the
injection of any foreign capital into the Russian economy. In doing
this, the Tribunal also recognized that the ECT was intended to pro-
mote cross-border investment in the energy sector between western
European states and successor states of the USSR.1 38 However, the
tribunal rejected Russia's assertion that the definition of investment
132 Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, Partial Award,
240 (Mar. 17, 2006).
133 Id. 241.
134 id.
135 Id.
136 Yukos Universal, 414.
137 Id. 9 415.
138 Id. 434.
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under the ECT necessarily required an injection of foreign capital.1 3 9
While it implied that such a foreign injection should be expected, the
Tribunal nonetheless concluded that it is "bound to interpret the terms
of the ECT not as they might have been written so as exclusively to
apply to foreign investment but as they were actually written."1 4 0
The Yukos Universal Tribunal was correct to rely on the Article
31 of the VCLT in interpreting the ECT and to find that the VCLT
requires that treaties be interpreted according their plain meaning in
light of their object and purpose. It was also correct to find that a plain
reading of Article 1(7) of the ECT requires no more than a company be
incorporated in a state party to the treaty to have standing to bring an
ECT claim, regardless of the consequences of this approach.
Treaties use various definitions to determine investor stand-
ing. Besides jurisdiction of organization, these include place of man-
agement, place of control, or a combination thereof.1 4 1 However, as
noted by the Yukos Universal Tribunal, "the State of incorporation is
the most common method of defining the nationality of a company. "142
This is not a coincidence. States know well the options available to
them to delimit nationality. Furthermore, the consequences of these
different choices have been thoroughly discussed and debated for some
time. 14 3 It is therefore reasonable to assume that they clearly under-
stand the ramifications of their decisions on this point as far as treaty
shopping practices are concerned.
It is also important to note that there are advantages to the
"organizational" definition of investor nationality which go a long way
toward explaining why this standard is so often adopted in investment
treaties. Chief among these is that it establishes a bright line test that
is subject to clear application and which avoids difficult qualitative
and quantitative determinations. Where the "organizational" test is
used it is unnecessary to examine any inherently complex concepts
such as what constitutes "management." So too is it unnecessary to
parse the meaning of control, including whether this includes de facto
139 Id. 432.
140 Id. 435.
141 See Catherine Yannaca-Small, Definition of Investor and Investment in Inter-
national Investment Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: UNDER-
STANDING CONCEPTS AND TRACKING INNOVATIONS 7, 18-28 (OECD, 2008).
142 Yukos Universal, $ 416. In so doing it echoed the rulings of the Tribunals in
Rompetrol v. Romania and Tokios Tokel6s v. Ukraine. See Rompetrol Group N.V. v
Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Decision on Respondent's Preliminary Objec-
tions on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, at $ 83 (Apr. 18, 2008); Tokios Tokelds v.
Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 63 (Apr. 29,
2004).
143 See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb.
5).
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control alongside de jure control as well as the effect of other possible
sources of control such as parent companies and other affiliates,
whether domestic or foreign. Finally, while it is true that the "organi-
zational" definition of nationality may result in situations which con-
flict with other parts of a treaty, such as the idea that its purpose is to
attract investment from counterparties, this is not necessarily fatal.
As stated by D'Allaire, although "[p]rovisions of an investment treaty
shall be interpreted in light of the treaty's object and purpose, . . . this
does not mean that any consequence of the application of a provision
must necessarily be fulfilling the intended purpose."' 4 4 Furthermore,
should ECT signatories desire to prohibit the practice of treaty shop-
ping made possible by the plain construction of Article 1(7), this course
of action always remains available to them pursuant to Article
17( 1).145
Article 17(1)
Article 17 of the ECT is not a unique provision and has coun-
terparts in other international investment treaties.1 6 These provi-
sions are usually collectively referred to as "denial of benefits"
clauses.147 "Denial of benefits" clauses such as Article 17(1) are in-
serted into investment treaties for two reasons. First, "to maintain
reciprocity or asymmetry with regard to the benefits arising out of the
protection offered by investment treaties," and second, to "exclude
from the protection of the treaties the so-called 'shell companies.'"148
In other words, the purpose of denial of benefits clauses such as ECT
Article 17(1) is to prevent treaty shopping through the incorporation of
shell companies or similar corporate vehicles."'
While "denial of benefits" clauses are relatively common, case
law addressing them is sparse both in number and content. Yukos
Universal was the second case to examine the ECT Article 17(1) "de-
nial of benefits" clause. The first instance occurred in Plarna. Other
tribunals have looked at "denial of benefits" clauses, but in the context
of different bilateral investment treaties and for the most part very
fleetingly.1s0 Consequently, the treatment given to ECT Article 17(1)
144 D'Allaire, supra note 65, at 50.
145 ECT, supra note 3, arts. 1(7), 17(1).
146 See North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1113, U.S.-Can.-Mex, Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993); U.S. Model BIT (2004); U.S. Model BIT (1994); Cana-
dian Model Foreign Investment Protection Agreement (FIPA) (2004).
147 See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAw 55 (OXFORD UNIV. PRESS, 2008).
148 Mistelis & Baltag, supra note 114, at 1302.
149 Id. at 1313; see also Jagusch & Sinclair, supra note 63, at 90-91.
o50 For example, in Waste Management v. Mexico, a NAFTA Chapter Eleven case,
the Tribunal mentioned that Treaty's denial of benefits clause merely to note that
YUKOS UNIVERSAL V. RUSSIA
in Yukos Universal and Plama is of relatively significant importance.
The tribunals in these cases expended considerable energy scrutiniz-
ing Article 17(1). They also arrived at near identical interpretations
and applications of it. The result is the beginning of a relatively uni-
form body of case law flushing out the full dimensions of ECT Article
17(1). The result is also an interpretation which is, generally speak-
ing, favourable to the interests of shell companies and their owners
and controllers. However, the rulings delivered in Yukos Universal
and Plama are far from a comprehensive exposition of Article 17(1)
and much of its application has yet to be decisively determined.
The construction of Article 17(1) poses a number of questions.
These include queries regarding how the clause must be exercised,
when the clause can be legitimately exercised, and the effects of its
exercise. As discussed, the Tribunal in Yukos Universal posited sev-
eral answers to these questions. It held that Article 17(1) did not func-
tion to automatically deny shell companies standing under the ECT.x'
It found that Article 17(1) must be affirmatively exercised by an ECT
signatory. 1 52 It also held that once exercised, Article 17(1) will only
have prospective and not retrospective effect.' 5 3 In addition, the Yukos
Universal Tribunal highlighted the two substantive conditions inher-
ent to Article 17(1) that must be met for a purported exercise of the
clause to be effective.' First, the legal entity in question "must be
owned or controlled by citizens or nationals of a third State."' 5 Sec-
ondly, the legal entity in question "must have no substantial business
activities in the place in which it is organized." 56
The analysis of the Yukos Universal Tribunal closely follows
the ruling of the Tribunal in Plama. 1 7 In that case, the Tribunal was
faced with a claim made by an entity incorporated in Cyprus - Plama
Consortium Limited - against Bulgaria. Plama had no substantial
it addresses "situations where the investor is simply an intermediary for interests
substantially foreign, and it allows NAFTA protections to be withdrawn in such
cases (subject to prior notification and consultation)." Waste Management Inc. v.
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, 80 (Apr. 30,
2004).
151 Yukos T 456.
152 Id.
153 Id. 458.
154 Id. 460. The Tribunal held that because Article 17 had not been correctly
exercised by Russia in relation to Yukos Universal, there was no need, strictly
speaking, for it to establish whether these two elements were satisfied in the cir-
cumstances at hand. See id. 461.
155 Id. 460.
156 Id.
157 Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case ARB/03/24, Deci-
sion on Jurisdiction, 44 I.L.M. 721 (Feb. 8, 2005).
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business activities in Cyprus, and, as such, the Respondent sought to
deny it the benefits of the ECT pursuant to Article 17(1).s58 The
Plama Tribunal held that "the existence of a 'right' is distinct from the
exercise of that right" and that, as a result, a "Contracting Party has a
right under Article 17(1) ECT to deny a covered investor the advan-
tages under Part III; but it is not required to exercise that right; and it
may never do so." 159 In this regard, the Plama Tribunal compared the
wording of Article 17(1) to different "denial of benefits" clauses in other
bilateral investment treaties which automatically deny the benefits of
those treaties to shell companies owned or controlled by investors of
third states.16 0 It then held that Article 17 constitutes at best "only
half a notice" that requires something more to be effectual. 61 The
Plama Tribunal also held that the object and purpose of the ECT-to
establish a legal framework "to promote long-term cooperation in the
energy field" 1 6 2-made it clear that any exercise of Article 17(1) could
only be prospective, and not retrospective, in effect.1 6 1
The confluence of these decisions is noteworthy. Together they
represent the nascent stages of a broader and firmer body of invest-
ment arbitration case law. Under this body of law, ECT Article 17(1)
will not deny shell companies standing to bring claims under the
Treaty until it has been positively exercised by the host into which the
shell companies have invested. This interpretation is directly benefits
investors from states that are not a party to the ECT but who are
nonetheless interested in accessing its protective terms. It provides
them the opportunity to access the ECT through the incorporation of a
shell company in the territory of an ECT signatory state. It also pro-
vides that this strategy will be effective until Article 17(1) is positively
exercised by the host state. This interpretation directly complements
the interpretation of Article 1(7) adopted by the Yukos Universal Tri-
bunal. It effectively opens the ECT to entities and investors the world
over with the means to incorporate a shell company in any ECT signa-
tory, from the United Kingdom to Kazakhstan.
158 Id. at 728.
159 Id. at 745. Like Russia, in Plama Bulgaria argued that Article 17(1) was in-
tended to confer on signatories "a direct and unconditional right of denial which
may be exercised at any time and in any manner." Id. at 743. Bulgaria also ar-
gued that its decision under Article 17(1) was effectively unreviewable by the Tri-
bunal because if an investor was denied access to Part III of the ECT, then it was
also denied access to Part V of the ECT, that part of the treaty providing for the
arbitration of disputes. See id. at 742-43.
160 Id. at 745 (citing ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services, art. VI, Dec. 15,
1995).
161 Id.
162 ECT, supra note 3, art. 2.
163 Plama, at 746.
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That said, it is critical to note there is no strict principle of
stare decisis in international investment arbitration. The majority of
investment tribunals profess that, "subject to compelling contrary
grounds," they have a duty "to adopt solutions established in a series
of consistent cases."' 6 4 These Tribunals locate such a duty in the need
to "to contribute to the harmonious development of investment law"
and thereby "meet the legitimate expectations of the community of
States and investors towards the certainty of the rule of law.""' How-
ever, a minority of arbitrators understand it to be their duty "to decide
each case on its own merits, independently of any apparent jurispru-
dential trend.""6 6 Thus, while future investment tribunals will likely
give good weight to the decisions rendered in Yukos Universal and
Plama, they will not be required to adhere to them. Furthermore, as
these cases remain limited in number, it remains easier for a future
tribunal to break from the trend they establish than if the case law
had been more robust 16 7
It is also important to note that questions can be asked of the
decisions made in these cases. It is a plausible argument that the
mere existence of Article 17(1) is enough to put prospective investors
on notice "that they could be denied ECT protection if they fell within
its scope."" 8 As stated by Jagusch, "[olne might fairly expect . .. that
in the light of Article 17, a well-advised investor would seek additional
undertakings and comfort from the host state and would not under-
take capital investments in reliance upon mere speculation as to the
availability of treaty protection.""6 s This only makes sense. Overseas
investment operations are costly and complex matters, and one would
164 Burlington Res. Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Deci-
sion on Jurisdiction, T 100 (June 2, 2010); Saipem S.p.A. v. People's Republic of
Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction, 66-67 (Mar.
21, 2007). See generally Jeffery P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: A Citation Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence, 24 J. INT'L ARB.
129 (2007) (reviewing the role played by prior decisions in treaty tribunal awards
and orders); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or
Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT'L 357 (2007) (analyzing the use of precedents in different
arbitration contexts and explaining the consistency such precedents provide).
165 Burlington, 1 100.
166 Id.
167 After all, at least some commentators followed the reasoning of Russia and
Bulgaria and initially interpreted ECT Article 17 to be always available to the
host state without precondition. See Thomas W. Waelde, International Investment
Under the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty: Legal, Negotiating and Policy Implications
for International Investors Within Western and Commonwealth of Independent
States/Eastern European Countries, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 27 (1995).
168 Jagusch & Sinclair, supra note 63, at 99; see also Shore, supra note 96, at 64
(explaining the reasonable notice provided by Article 17).
169 Jagusch &Sinclair, supra note 63, at 100.
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assume that investors would prefer to be certain of their rights from
such a transaction's inception. The charge that it is onerous to put the
burden on states to investigate the ownership of each inward bound
investment is also a legitimate criticism. As asserted by Mistelis and
Baltag, "states usually become aware of the circumstances justifying
the denial of benefits only when faced with a claim by a presumptive
investor.""o This reality makes it difficult for host States to monitor
which foreign investors might fall under the ambit of Article 17(1) and
so decide against whom they should exercise it.
However, there are credible counterarguments to these indict-
ments, as the well-reasoned and methodical decisions laid down in
Yukos Universal and Plama evidence. Furthermore, these replies gain
force with each likeminded tribunal award. Some argue that the mere
existence of ECT Article 17(1) serves notice to shell companies that
they may be denied standing under the Treaty. 171 However, it can
now be said that the inverse is true: that the rulings by the Yukos
Universal and Plama Tribunals serve as notice to all ECT signatories
that they should make proactive use of Article 17(1) or risk losing its
benefit. As such, while ECT signatories may disagree with this inter-
pretation of Article 17, they can no longer claim to be surprised by it.
Therefore, if they seek to guarantee their rights under ECT Article
17(1) they should now turn their attention toward exercising the provi-
sion in a preventative manner. In accordance with Yukos Universal
and Plama , this means exercising Article 17(1) prior to the develop-
ment of investment dispute rather than after an ECT arbitration claim
has been made and doing so in a public manner reasonably available
to investors that specifically references the ECT.1 7 2
If the interpretation of Article 17(1) reached in Yukos Univer-
sal and Plama becomes the established standard going forward, then
energy firms from non-ECT signatory states interested in expanding
into Europe and Asia will have good reason to cheer. However, their
approval should be a cautious one. It is true that the Tribunals in
these cases were in agreement on several key points. However, it is
170 Mistelis & Baltag, supra note 114, at 1315; see also Jagusch & Sinclair, supra
note 63, at 101.
171 Shore, supra note 96, at 64.
172 Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case ARB/03/24, Deci-
sion on Jurisdiction, 44 I.L.M. 721, 745 (Feb. 8, 2005); see Yukos Universal Ltd.
(Isle of Man) v. Russian Federation, 457 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/YULvRussianFederation-InterimAward-
30Nov2009.pdf. The Plama Tribunal held that such public notice could include an
official declaration in the Contracting State's gazette, a statutory provision in the
state's investment law, or even "an exchange of letters with a particular investor
or class of investors." Plama, 44 I.L.M. at 745. Article 17(1) is silent on how it
must be exercised. See Mistelis & Baltag, supra note 113, at 1319.
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equally true that their treatment of Article 17(1) was not entirely com-
prehensive. Several crucial issues associated with Article 17(1) have
yet to be investigated in detail and much of the fortunes of shell com-
panies can still turn on these points. In particular, the Tribunals in
Yukos Universal and Plama Consortium neglected to determine ex-
actly what constitutes "substantial business activities"1 7 3 for the pur-
poses of Article 17(1) as well as which party bears the burden of
addressing this standard. They also neglected to definitely determine
when the Article must be exercised during the life cycle of an invest-
ment project and what the effects of such timing may be.
The Yukos Universal Tribunal emphasized that Article 17(1)
will be irrelevant where the purported shell company is not "owned" or
"controlled" by an investor from a non-ECT state or does in fact have
"substantial business activities" in the jurisdiction of its incorpora-
tion.1 7 4 In the case at hand, the Yukos Universal Tribunal identified
control in the ownership of a majority of shares through two corporate
levels and a further level of seven trusts.1 7' This interpretation is in
line with the ECT, which defines control to include "control in fact,
determined after an examination of the actual circumstances of each
situation."1 7 ' Nor does it contradict the ruling of the tribunal in
Plama which held that ownership included both "indirect and benefi-
cial ownership" and that control includes "control in fact, including an
ability to exercise substantial influence over the legal entity's manage-
ment, operation and the selection of members of its board of directors
or any other managing body." 7
These rulings are instructive. They do much to inform what is
meant by "control" under the provisions of the ECT and largely compli-
ment related investment arbitration case law.'17 However, neither the
Yukos Universal Tribunal nor the Plama Tribunal turned their atten-
tion to the meaning of the term "substantial business activities" as
173 ECT, supra note 3, art. 17(1).
174 Yukos, 460.
175 Id. T1 536-537.
176 Final Act of the European Energy Charter Conference, Dec. 16-17, 1994, 34
I.L.M. 360, 375 (1994).
177 Plama, 44 I.L.M. at 747.
178 Related international investment arbitration case law clearly supports the no-
tion that de jure control will satisfy an otherwise undefined control standard
under an investment treaty. See D'Allaire, supra note 65, at 56. (citing Int'l Thun-
derbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, NAFTA, Award, 101-110
(Jan. 26, 2006); Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9,
Final Award, 44 I.L.M. 404 (Sept. 16, 2003)). Related international arbitration
case law also generally supports the notion that de facto control will satisfy such
an otherwise undefined treaty control requirement. See id. at 56 (citing Vacuum
Salt Prod. v. Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/92/1, Award, 43 (Feb. 16, 1994)).
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contained in ECT Article 17(1).' Nor is the term expressly defined
by the ECT. This leaves much to interpretation with little in the way
of formal guidance. After all, the "criterion of substantial business
presence is subjective."' It seems clear that a shell company would
not clear this hurdle, existing as it would only on paper and without
engaging in any form of business activity.'a8 However, more difficult
factual scenarios are not difficult to imagine. For example, what about
a company incorporated in the United Kingdom and listed on the
FTSE (London's stock exchange) but with the vast majority of its busi-
ness operations and staff located in a foreign, non-ECT jurisdiction?
Alternatively, what about the case of a satellite subsidiary that is
dwarfed by and ultimately acts as the arm of its foreign corporate par-
ent? Furthermore, should the amount of business considered to be
"substantial" be decided on absolute or relative terms?
The ECT provides no guidance on these points. Nor does the
Treaty expressly address which party should bear the burden of satis-
fying the substantial business activities standard. Durward Sandifer
stated long ago that, as a general rule, "the burden of proof rests upon
him who asserts the affirmative of a proposition that if not substanti-
ated will result in a decision adverse to his contention."1 8 2 This princi-
ple suggests that because it is the host state that activates Article 17,
the host state also bears the burden of establishing that its require-
ments are met, including proof that the claimant has no substantial
business activities in the jurisdiction of its organization. However, it
is unclear whether this formulation is appropriate in the context of
ECT Article 17. D'Allaire rightly points out that "[b]ringing evidence
to the effect that a given corporation has no substantial business activ-
ities is already difficult, but for a state to demonstrate that a private
entity has no substantial business activities in a foreign jurisdiction
may end up being challenging.""sa It is difficult enough to evidence a
negative contention. It is even more difficult to do so from a distance.
179 It was not necessary to do so in Yukos Universal because Yukos Universal
freely admitted that it did not have substantial business activities in the Isle of
Man. See Yukos Universal, 1 461. Similarly, in Plama, Plama Consortium admit-
ted that it did not have substantial business activities in Cyprus. See Plama, 44
I.L.M. at 732.
'so D'Allaire, supra note 65, at 57.
'81 See Mistelis & Baltag, supra note 114, at 1315.
182 DURWARD V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 127 (rev.
ed. 1975).
183 D'Allaire, supra note 65, at 57. Related case law is not of much assistance. The
issue of burden of proof is not directly addressed by the Tribunal in Yukos Univer-
sal. The Tribunal in Plama, on the other hand, sent mixed signals on this point. As
noted by D'Allaire, at one point its decision implies that that the party asserting
an argument has the burden of proving it. On the other hand, its reasoning also
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The finer points regarding the timing and related effects of
ECT Article 17(1) have also yet to be determined. Both Russia and
Bulgaria purported to exercise their rights under ECT Article 17(1)
well after the investments in question had taken place. As such, in
both cases the Tribunals held that it would counter the object and pur-
pose of the ECT to allow a subsequent exercise of Article 17 to retroac-
tively dissolve the standing that Claimants were to that point entitled
to. However, neither Tribunal considered what the effect of Article 17
would be in slightly more complicated circumstances. In particular,
neither Tribunal considered what the effect of a purported exercise of
ECT Article 17(1) would be well after an investment's inception but
prior to the institution of an investment arbitration claim. This point
begs several questions. First, must Article 17 be exercised prior to the
investment being made? What if the Article is exercised during the
middle of an investment's life cycle? Does the exercise of Article 17 at
such an intermediary stage effectively cut an investment in half for
the purpose of ECT protection so that claims can only be levied in re-
sponse to acts occurring before the exercise of the Article? Finally,
how would such a division affect the calculation of damages in the
event of any future award in favour of the Claimant? The answers are
not immediately clear.
Once could argue that an exercise of ECT Article 17(1) will be
effective so long as it occurs after an investment has been made. This
would be a nice, simple, bright line rule capable of easy application
with little confusion. However, one could also argue that such an ap-
proach would be open to easy manipulation by host states. The Tribu-
nal in Plama held that it would be unfair to apply Article 17(1)
retroactively because such retroactive application would rob investors
of the ability to accurately anticipate and plan for the protection avail-
able to their investments. 1 84 However, the validity of this argument
does not necessarily diminish after the investment has been made. As
seems to imply that the other party was also expected to submit evidence on the
issue. Other investment arbitration tribunals have looked at the burden issue
more closely, albeit in the context of treaties other than the ECT. In Generation
Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, for example, the tribunal held that the respondent host
state seeking to invoke the denial of benefits clause bears the onus of establishing
the factual basis of control by a non-signatory party. See Generation Ukraine, 44
I.L.M. 404, 433 (2005). In contrast, in CCL v. Kazakhstan, the tribunal held that
the investor bringing a claim has the burden of providing to the Tribunal "the
necessary information and evidence concerning the circumstances of ownership
and control, directly and indirectly, over [Claimant-investor] at all relevant times."
CCL v. Kazakhstan, SCC Case 122/2001, Jurisdictional Award at 152 (Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, 2003), available at http://ita.1aw.uvic.ca/documents/
CCLvKazakhstan.pdf.
184 Plama, 44 I.L.M. at 747.
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the Tribunal in Plama also recognized, once a foreign direct invest-
ment is made, a "hostage factor" takes effect which limits the inves-
tor's choices and renders it "correspondingly more vulnerable to the
host state's exercise of its right under Article 17(1)."18 The investor is
committed. Its interests are vested and cannot easily be uprooted, and
it is at the mercy of the host state's policies going forward. This means
that "the covered investor needs at least the same protection as it en-
joyed as a putative investor able to plan its investment."' 6 To hold
otherwise would be to allow ECT host states to entice foreign invest-
ment on the premise of ECT protection only to dissolve that protection
afterward through the exercise of Article 17(1).
In the alternative, one could argue that an exercise of ECT Ar-
ticle 17(1) after an investment has been made will be effective so long
as it occurs prior to the host state action which forms the basis of any
related investment arbitration claim."' This approach would extend
the investor's protection under the ECT past its inception and further
into its life cycle. This approach would also put the onus on the host
state to exercise its Article 17(1) rights well before engaging in any
activity which could otherwise be considered a violation of its ECT ob-
ligations. However, this approach does not go so far as to totally dispel
the concerns of the Plama Tribunal canvassed above. In particular, it
does not prevent a host state from gaming the system simply by exer-
cising Article 17(1) before engaging in sovereign behaviour otherwise
prohibited by the ECT. Illegitimate host state interference with an
investment project can take many forms. It may occur in discrete acts
that instantly alter the fortunes of an investor and amount to indepen-
dent violations of investment treaty standards. It may also occur in a
series of smaller, interrelated acts which collectively amount to a com-
posite breach of a protective guarantee. 8 8 Where the latter is the
case, a "breach centered" approach to ECT Article 17(1) is highly prob-
lematic. It would effectively condone a campaign of state interference
which approaches but does not effectively cross the line between non-
abusive and abusive treatment. In the case of creeping or indirect ex-
propriation, for example, this could excuse all initial harmful changes
to a host state's petroleum law prior to that change which finally un-
dermines the economic viability of the project. 8 9
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Kaj Hober appears to read this to be the implied reasoning of the Plama Con-
sortium Tribunal. See Hober, supra note 36, at 351.
188 See Siemens AG v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award,
264, 271 (Feb. 6, 2007).
189 Zeyad A. AlQurashi, Indirect Expropriation in the Field of Petroleum, 5 J.
WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 897 (2004).
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CONCLUSION
The ECT has been on the radar screen of "treaty shoppers" for
some time.'9 o This is not likely to change any time soon. The Treaty
is perhaps the most significant and far-reaching international invest-
ment protection treaty yet concluded, particularly where the interna-
tional energy industry is concerned. It covers a large and diverse set of
developed and transitional economies stretching from Western Europe
through Central Asia to the Far East. It provides foreign investors
organized under the laws of these countries a comprehensive set of
protective guaranties designed to deter illegitimate sovereign interfer-
ence with their business interests. It also provides these investors with
a reliable and impartial set of arbitration forums before which to settle
any investment disputes that might arise.
The ruling of the Tribunal in Yukos Universal ensures that this
affinity will persist for the immediately foreseeable future. First, it
affirms previous case law establishing that jurisdictional provisions
which require merely that a company is organized according to the
laws of a signatory should be given their plain meaning regardless of
the consequences. It makes this assertion in regard to ECT Article
1(7) but the ruling builds on and is reinforced by a line of consistent
previous decisions related to similar standing provisions in other in-
vestment protection treaties. Secondly, it affirms the ruling of the Tri-
bunal in Plama that ECT Article 17(1) must be exercised by a host
state prior to the filing of an investment dispute by a disaffected inves-
tor. Importantly, this marks the second step in a potentially equally
consistent line of case law on the meaning and effect of the ECT's "de-
nial of benefits" clause. Taken together, these aspects of the Yukos
Universal jurisdictional award can only encourage prospective foreign
investors from non-ECT signatories to incorporate shell companies in
the jurisdiction of ECT signatories in attempt to gain access to the
Treaty's protective provisions.
Of course, as there exists no strict principle of stare decisis in
international investment law future shell companies will not be guar-
anteed the same treatment received by Yukos Universal. Rather, the
chance that future tribunals will break from the reasoning adopted by
the Yukos Universal Tribunal remains a distinct possibility. Much
will depend on the circumstances of the case and on the inclinations of
the particular investment tribunal, including the weight they place on
relevant investment arbitration precedent. The decision of the tribu-
nal in Yukos Universal v. Russia is authoritative in that it is soundly
argued and built on the back of its forebears. However, not all future
investment tribunals are certain to acknowledge these qualities. It is
190 See David Herlihy & Bruce Macaulay, Strategic Choices Under the ECT, 2
GLOBAL ARB. REV. 26 (2007).
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also important to remember that the decision in Yukos Universal v.
Russia does not finally answer all questions raised regarding the abil-
ity of shell companies to effectively harness the protective provisions of
the ECT. In particular, the decision fails to definitively rule on the
effect of a purported exercised of Article 17(1) during the middle of a
foreign investment's lifecycle but prior to the eruption or filing of an
investment dispute. This is a significant issue which may one day lead
to fervent legal debate with billions of dollars of potential damages
again hanging in the balance. Furthermore, as no precedent exists on
this point, the issue will be for an investment tribunal to decide as a
matter of first instance.
